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    Transcendental idealism does not deny the reality of obje... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Transcendental idealism is distinct from Berkeleianism

    Transcendental idealism does not deny the reality of objects in space and time, only identifies space and time as forms of intuition

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    Berkeleianism reduces all reality to ideas and the minds that have themTranscendental idealism is distinct from Berkeleianism

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    Kant himself did not think so, of course. He was utterly committed to transcendental idealism. When confronted with the challenge that transcendental idealism was nothing but Berkeleianism, however, that is, the reduction of all reality to ideas and the minds that have them, he recoiled. This objection was made in the first substantial review of the first edition of the Critique, written from an empiricist point of view by Christian Garve and then redacted by J.H. Feder in 1782 (Garve-Feder 1782

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