Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    True propositions can be stated about non-existent objects. — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    True propositions can be stated about non-existent objects.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Non-existent objects are a genuine ontological category.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Non-existent objects can possess properties.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If an object possesses a property, true things can be said about that object.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Singular terms that fail to refer to existing objects fail to express genuine propositions, yielding only apparent statements (Russell, 'On Denoting').
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Apparent statements about 'the present King of France' are neither true nor false, because they lack a genuine subject of predication.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Without a genuine proposition, there is no truth-apt content, so 'true propositions about non-existents' is a category error.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Possessing a property requires instantiation in some domain, and non-existent objects instantiate nothing (Quine, 'On What There Is').
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Statements that appear to be about Pegasus or Holmes are best analyzed as predications on concepts or descriptions, not on objects themselves.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If the purported truth is really about a concept or description rather than an object, the claim that non-existent objects bear properties is dissolved rather than vindicated.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Modality & Possibility2 linked

    Related

    Apparent statements about 'the present King of France' are neither true nor fals...If an object possesses a property, true things can be said about that object.If the purported truth is really about a concept or description rather than an o...Non-existent objects are a genuine ontological category.
    +5 moreShow less
    Non-existent objects can possess properties.Possessing a property requires instantiation in some domain, and non-existent ob...Singular terms that fail to refer to existing objects fail to express genuine pr...Statements that appear to be about Pegasus or Holmes are best analyzed as predic...Without a genuine proposition, there is no truth-apt content, so 'true propositi...

    Similar

    There are non-existent objects.89%There are no non-existent objects.87%Non-existent objects can possess properties.86%Not all properties and relations entail existence, so non-existent obj...86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: findlay
    View source passageHide passage
    The dispute turned, notoriously, on the status of non-existent objects. For Meinong, there are non-existent objects, they can possess properties, and true things can be said about them. For Russell, there are no non-existing objects, they cannot possess properties, and nothing true can be said about them. So, for Meinong, it is true the golden mountain is golden, because everything that is F and G is F. For Russell, it is false that the golden mountain is golden, because there is no such thing a
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit