Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Truth values are distinct from the senses (Sinnen) or Thoughts (Gedanken) of propositions.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Strawson argued that truth is not a property of propositions or sentences but a performative assertion of endorsement, dissolving the need for truth values as distinct entities.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If truth-talk is performative rather than descriptive, then positing truth values as metaphysically distinct from propositional senses introduces unnecessary Platonist ontology with no explanatory payoff.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Frege's own context principle suggests that terms have meaning only in sentential contexts, which undermines treating 'The True' as a freestanding object separable from the thoughts that present it.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.For Frege, 'The True' and 'The False' are objects denoted by sentences, making truth values referents (Bedeutungen), not separate metaphysical entities distinct from sense.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If truth values are simply the referents of sentences in Frege's semantic scheme, then distinguishing them 'from' senses merely restates the sense/reference distinction rather than establishing truth values as independently ontologically significant.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Frege distinguished truth values from what he called Thoughts (Gedanken) or senses (Sinnen) of propositions.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Each sentential sense 'presents' a truth value in a certain way — as the value of a certain indicated function given a certain indicated argument.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.