Tulving's concept of episodic memory as 'mental time travel' requires autonoetic consciousness, a first-person temporal indexing that purely representational content cannot supply.
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episodic memory(Distinguished from semantic memory by its first-person experiential character and its logical entailment of personal identity)
Memory of a specific past event that logically entails the rememberer's existence at the time of that event, governed by the Previous Awareness Condition
mental time travel(Research framework that motivates the continuism/discontinuism debate)
The cognitive capacity encompassing both episodic memory (mentally revisiting past events) and episodic future thought (mentally pre-experiencing future events), treated as aspects of a single faculty