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    Two theories can share all metaphysical necessities yet d... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Metaphysical modal entailment is insufficient as a criterion for ontological commitment because ontological commitment is sensitive to distinctions that metaphysical necessity cannot accommodate.

    Two theories can share all metaphysical necessities yet differ in their bound variables, meaning modal entailment cannot substitute for the syntactic criterion Quine identifies.

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    Modality & Possibility1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

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