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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    Type b2 choosing r is irrational because b2 believes both... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→It is not common knowledge that both Ann and Bob are rational

    Type b2 choosing r is irrational because b2 believes both of Ann's options are equally probable

    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge

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    Ann's positive credence in an irrational type for Bob means rationality is not c...It is not common knowledge that both Ann and Bob are rationalType a3 assigns 0.5 probability to Bob being of type b2 and choosing r

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    SEP: epistemic-game
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    Consider the state \((d,r,a_3,b_3)\). Both \(a_3\) and \(b_3\) correctly believe (i.e., assign probability 1 to) that the outcome is \((d,r)\) (we have \(\lambda_A(a_3)(r)=\lambda_B(b_3)(d)=1\)). This fact is not common knowledge: \(a_3\) assigns a 0.5 probability to Bob being of type \(b_2\), and type \(b_2\) assigns a 0.5 probability to Ann playing \(l\). Thus, Ann does not know that Bob knows that she is playing \(r\) (here, “knowledge” is identified with “probability 1” as it is in Aumann &a

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