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    Under extended cognition frameworks, external agents can ... — Carmelics
    Home/Virtue Ethics
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    Supports→In some cases, pairs of agents mutually constitute each other's intellectual character.

    Under extended cognition frameworks, external agents can be partially constitutive of an individual's cognitive dispositions.

    Consciousness & MindVirtue Ethics
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    Virtue EthicsConsciousness & Mind

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    Dynamic interactions between agents can involve interlocking virtues.In some cases, pairs of agents mutually constitute each other's intellectual cha...

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    When a cognitive agent is suitably integrated with natural objects, ar...87%Embedded, scaffolded, and extended cognition frameworks show that cogn...82%Internal aspects that provide a basis for cognition arise simultaneous...79%What determines the content of one's mind must lie in the external con...77%

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    This suggestion is in line with the third main response to epistemic situationism, which is to somehow offload some of the cognitive agency traditionally required of the individual onto the material, social, or political environment. For instance, Pritchard (2014) argues for a more modest version of VE that countenances the essential role of the environment in the acquisition of knowledge. Someone who is luckily placed in their material, social, and political environment will end up with more kn

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