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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Under Frege's theory, 'Juliet' and 'Romeo' contribute modes of presentation, not bare objects, making substitution of variables non-trivial.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Modes of presentation are notoriously difficult to individuate and ontologically characterize, making Frege's theory metaphysically obscure.
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    • 2.Modern causal-historical accounts explain name reference without invoking modes of presentation, providing a simpler alternative explanation.
      ?

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    • 3.Substitution failures may reflect pragmatic context-dependence rather than semantic content, undercutting Frege's theoretical motivation.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Proper names like 'Juliet' have different cognitive significance for speakers despite referring to the same individual, suggesting distinct modes of presentation.
      ?

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    • 2.If names contributed only bare objects, 'Romeo loves Juliet' and 'Romeo loves Romeo' would be logically equivalent, contradicting their apparent informativeness.
      ?

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    • 3.Substitution preserving truth-value requires more than referential identity; it requires sameness of sense, supporting Frege's distinction.
      ?

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