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    Under Parfit's Extreme Claim, in the absence of the furth... — Carmelics
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    Home/Personal Identity
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    Supports→If momentary experiencers (atoms) are the only relevant units, then individual lives and sets of lives are completely analogous, and there is no reason to apply distributive principles within individual lives but not across sets of lives.

    Under Parfit's Extreme Claim, in the absence of the further fact of identity there are no significant unifying relations beyond momentary experiencers.

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    If individual lives and sets of lives are metaphysically equivalent collections,...If momentary experiencers (atoms) are the only relevant units, then individual l...If neither individual lives nor sets of lives are unified by any significant met...

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    The success of arguments for this conclusion actually depends on the specific version of reductionism being advanced. After all, there are several possible ethically significant metaphysical units compatible with reductionism, and it turns out that the larger the unit, the less successful the argument will be. As the authors on this topic do, we will focus just on the three possible psychological units: persons, selves, and atoms. If one believes that the only relevant units are atoms (momentar

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