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Inverse View
It is not the case that Universal instantiation from '∀x∀y[L(x,y)]' presupposes a fixed, uniform domain, but names like 'Romeo' may fail to rigidly refer to any actual domain element.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Quantified formulas in fiction or mathematics need not have concrete domains; abstract or fictional domains are valid domains in model-theoretic semantics.
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2.
Names can rigidly designate without actual instantiation—Kripke allows for rigid designation of non-existent entities in counterfactual and fictional discourse.
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3.
The failure of rigid reference is an epistemological problem, not a logical one; universal instantiation operates syntactically regardless of referential success.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Fictional names like 'Romeo' lack referents in actual reality, so instantiating quantified formulas with them violates the domain-theoretic foundations of first-order logic.
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2.
Universal instantiation requires a fixed domain; without it, substitution instances become meaningless when names fail to pick out domain elements.
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3.
Kripke's rigid designator theory shows names are modally inflexible—they cannot shift referents across contexts, making non-referential names logically defective.
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