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    Value is conferred by desire, not by contribution to anot... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→Foundational monism with normative pluralism can account for deep complexities in choice.

    Value is conferred by desire, not by contribution to another value.

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
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    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

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    Donuts are not good because they contribute to another value; they are desired f...Foundational monism with normative pluralism can account for deep complexities i...If it is hard to choose between donuts and hot baths, this difficulty stems from...Plural goods between which an agent chooses do not appear merely instrumental.

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    A desire represents a specific act (F-ing) as worthwhile or attractive...79%True value, on Marcus's view, is determined by a thing's contribution ...79%If activities are valued independently of desire or pleasure, then ple...79%The pleasure that attends the satisfaction of a desire is consequentia...78%

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    SEP: value-pluralism
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    This version of foundational monism/normative pluralism escapes some of the problems that attend the goods approach. First, this view can account for deep complexities in choice. The plural goods that P is choosing between do not seem merely instrumental. Donuts are not good because they contribute to another value, and P does not desire donuts for any reason other than their donuty nature. On this view, if it is hard to choose between donuts and hot baths it is because of the intrinsic nature o

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