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    We are not entitled to assert the existence of both ideas... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    We are not entitled to assert the existence of both ideas and the minds that have them — only the existence of ideas themselves.

    Consciousness & MindSkepticism
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Hume's bundle theory shows the 'self' is just a collection of perceptions with no additional substrate beneath them.
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    • 2.If the mind just is its ideas bundled together, positing 'mind' as a separate existent is a redundant ontological duplication.
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    • 3.Ockham's Razor demands we eliminate entities that do no explanatory work beyond what the ideas themselves already accomplish.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Berkeley's esse est percipi establishes that the being of any item consists in its being perceived, not in a perceiver distinct from perception.
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    • 2.A 'mind' posited as something over and above the stream of ideas inherits the same epistemic inaccessibility as Kant's unknowable thing-in-itself.
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    • 3.Asserting existence beyond what is epistemically accessible violates the verificationist constraint that meaningful assertions must be anchored in experiential content.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.We have no distinct idea of the mind as something separate from its impressions.
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    • 2.Asserting the existence of an entity requires having a genuine idea of it.
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    Topics

    SkepticismConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    A 'mind' posited as something over and above the stream of ideas inherits the sa...Asserting existence beyond what is epistemically accessible violates the verific...Asserting the existence of an entity requires having a genuine idea of it.Berkeley's esse est percipi establishes that the being of any item consists in i...
    +4 moreShow less
    Hume's bundle theory shows the 'self' is just a collection of perceptions with n...If the mind just is its ideas bundled together, positing 'mind' as a separate ex...Ockham's Razor demands we eliminate entities that do no explanatory work beyond ...

    Similar

    Physical objects do not exist independently of minds but consist solel...81%Whatever exists must fall within the category of ideas or minds.80%The only objects that exist for a mind are ideas, because there is not...80%We are entitled to assert the real existence of both subjects and obje...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: idealism
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    Hume’s attack on the supposition that we have an idea of the mind as distinct from its impressions thus constitutes a rejection of Berkeley’s commitment to the existence of mental substances, but not of idealism altogether. On Hume’s account, we are not entitled to assert the existence of both ideas and the minds, human or divine, that have them, but only the existence of the former. At the same time, he does not seem to think that we are forced into skepticism about either minds or external obj
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    We have no distinct idea of the mind as something separate from its impressions.
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit