Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    We can only be held responsible for actions if we know th... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→We must sometimes know our own beliefs and desires.

    We can only be held responsible for actions if we know the beliefs and desires that rationalize those actions.

    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Moral Responsibility
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    We can sometimes be held responsible for our actions (assumed for the sake of tr...We must sometimes know our own beliefs and desires.

    Similar

    We cannot be truly or ultimately morally responsible for our actions.85%Psychopaths may be held responsible, at least to some extent and in ce...85%We can sometimes be held responsible for our actions (assumed for the ...84%Ultimate responsibility for an action requires either that the action ...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: introspection
    View source passageHide passage
    Transcendental arguments for the accuracy of certain sorts of self-knowledge offer a different sort of epistemic guarantee—“transcendental arguments” being arguments that assume the existence of some sort of experience or capacity, then develop insights about the background conditions necessary for that experience or capacity, and finally conclude that those background conditions must in fact be met. Burge (1996; see also Shoemaker 1988) argues that to be capable of “critical reasoning” one must

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective