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    What is stated determines truth-conditions. — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Meaning alone does not determine what is stated, at least insofar as what is stated determines truth-conditions.

    What is stated determines truth-conditions.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

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    Meaning alone does not determine what is stated, at least insofar as what is sta...Sentence meanings do not determine truth-conditions.Therefore, meaning alone is insufficient to determine what is stated.

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Meaning alone does not determine what is stated, at least insofar as w...90%Sentence meanings do not determine truth-conditions.86%If sentence meaning combined with facts to determine truth-value, then...84%Sentence meaning does not simply combine with facts to determine truth...82%

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    We should avoid a possible misunderstanding of Austin here. His argument shows, at most, that whatever combines with the facts to determine a particular truth-value varies from occasion to occasion. That does nothing to dislodge the natural view that a sentence can carry its meaning with it from occasion to occasion, and thus possess a literal meaning. However, if we wish to retain that idea, we must give up on the idea that sentence meaning simply combines with the facts that are being spoken a

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