Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    What makes a mental event identical to a physical event i... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→A mental event is identical to a physical event because the mental event has a physical description.

    What makes a mental event identical to a physical event is that the mental event falls under a physical description.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Related

    A mental event is identical to a physical event because the mental event has a p...Token-identity theory holds that mental events are identical to physical events.

    Similar

    A mental event is identical to a physical event because the mental eve...

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Consciousness & Mind
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    98%
    Dualism entails that mental events are not token-identical with physic...90%
    Providing a physical description that applies to a mental event is wea...88%
    The only way a purely mental event could contribute to a purely physic...88%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: anomalous-monism
    View source passageHide passage
    An important point to recognize in Davidson’s version of token-identity is that he is not simply deriving the conclusion that mental events bear some property that we would intuitively acknowledge as ‘physical’ (such as spatial location). As pointed out in 2.1, the relevant ‘physical’ properties would more likely have to resemble the sorts of properties currently invoked in physics, our most mature science and the one closest to issuing in strict laws. This point has generated numerous objecti

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective