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    What qualifies non-psychological propositions as our evid... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Failing to address that a proposition is the content of an intuiting neglects something important about one's apparent justification for believing the proposition.

    What qualifies non-psychological propositions as our evidence in philosophy must have something to do with our epistemic justification for believing them.

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    Failing to address that a proposition is the content of an intuiting neglects so...Our justification for accepting the premises in an argument is of great importan...The intuitiveness of a proposition bears on our justification for believing it, ...

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    On the other hand, to fail to address the fact that the proposition in question is intuitive—that it is the content of an intuiting—is, it seems, to neglect something important about one’s apparent justification for believing the proposition. While most of our putative evidence in philosophy consists of non-psychological propositions, what qualifies such propositions as our evidence must have something to do with our epistemic justification for believing them. Even if philosophical argumentation

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