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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that What we conceive when imagining 'ourselves without bodies' may merely reflect our incomplete knowledge of mind-brain identity, not a genuine gap in nature.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The conceivability of disembodied consciousness appears irreducible to mere ignorance—it's structurally distinct from heat/motion cases.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If mind-brain identity were true, neural damage should be fully predictive of mental loss; explanatory gaps suggest otherwise.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Invoking 'incomplete knowledge' as explanation for conceivability gaps risks making physicalism unfalsifiable and unfalsifiable claims aren't science.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Historical science repeatedly revealed apparent gaps were ignorance, not real divisions (e.g., life/non-life, heat/matter).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.We can imagine disembodied minds yet lack introspective access to neural correlates, creating illusion of independence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Complete mind-brain identity is consistent with conceivability of disembodied minds if our concepts are simply incomplete.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.