When the relativist sets up an opposition between two or more alternative non-convergent epistemic systems, the relativist cannot avoid assuming the universality of at least some epistemic principles, including deduction, induction, and warrant through empirical evidence.
"Epistemic" relates to knowledge—how we know things, what counts as knowledge, and whether we can trust what we believe to be true. It comes from the Greek word for knowledge and is used to describe questions about the reliability and validity of our beliefs and understanding. For example, "epistemic humility" means acknowledging the limits of what you can actually know for certain.
Non-convergent epistemic systems(as the alternative belief systems the relativist compares)
Different ways of understanding what counts as knowledge that don't agree with each other or move toward the same conclusion.
Relativist(as the main subject of this statement)
A person who believes that truth, knowledge, or morality is not universal or absolute, but instead varies depending on perspective, culture, or context.
Universality (of principles)(as what the relativist must assume about epistemic principles)
The quality of applying everywhere and to everyone, rather than just in certain situations or for certain people.
induction(Offered as the mechanism behind empirical universality.)
The empirical method by which observations are generalized into rules; yields only comparative or assumed universality, not strict universality.
warrant(Toulmin's model of argumentation)
An implicit premise that an argument depends on, which licenses the move from evidence to conclusion; in this context, the unstated assumption that normal misdemeanor penalties are insufficient as a deterrent.
Boghossian has been criticized however for his characterization of epistemic relativism. One notable such criticism has been advanced by Crispin Wright (2008), who takes issue with Boghossian’s attributing to the epistemic relativist a version of (a) above, what Boghossian calls epistemic relationism, or the thesis that any claim of the form “Evidence E justifies belief B”, if it is to have any prospect of being true, must be construed as expressing the claim According to the epistemic system C,