Williamson's necessitism in 'Modal Logic as Metaphysics' demonstrates that possibilism's quantifiers range over all possibilia at every world, so no possibile can be 'altogether absent' from the global domain.
?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.
Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.
On Hartshorne's view, the study not of realities beyond the physical, but of features of reality that are ubiquitous or that would exist in any possible world.
necessitism(Philosophy of modality; a logical truth of SQML)
The view that everything that exists exists necessarily — both possibilia and actually existing things alike are necessary beings, such that there are no worlds from which they are altogether absent.
possibilia(The ontological commitments that actualists seek to avoid)
Merely possible individuals — entities that exist in some possible world but not in the actual world
possibilism(Contrasted with actualism; evaluates obligations based on what the agent could do, not what the agent will do.)
The view that an agent's obligations are determined by the best act-set possible for the agent across the relevant time span, regardless of what the agent will actually do.
possible worlds(Leibniz's modal semantics, anticipating contemporary possible-worlds semantics)
Worlds that have existence in a tenuous sense; fictional worlds used to characterize the nature of possibles that are never actualized
quantifiers(the logical form Russell said descriptions should take)
Words like 'all,' 'some,' and 'none' that express how many things we're talking about; Russell argued that phrases like 'the king of France' should be understood using these quantity-words rather than as simple names.