Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    With temporal insensitivity, towards the end of life we w... — Carmelics
    Home/Afterlife & Death
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→The preference for future goods is unfortunate.

    With temporal insensitivity, towards the end of life we would be comforted by the pleasures we have accumulated, even though our supply of future pleasures cannot be increased.

    Afterlife & Death
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Afterlife & Death

    Related

    If we cultivated temporal insensitivity (like the life- or pleasure-gourmand), w...The preference for future goods is unfortunate.

    Similar

    If we cultivated temporal insensitivity (like the life- or pleasure-go...

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Afterlife & Death
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    88%
    It is not surprising to find ourselves with no desire to extend life i...78%
    Even if we resolve to limit ourselves to desires whose objects cannot ...78%
    It is not irrational to prefer not to be at the end of our lives, unab...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: death
    View source passageHide passage
    According to Parfit, we have a far-reaching bias extending to goods in general: we prefer that any good things, not just pleasures, be in our future, and that bad things, if they happen at all, be in our past. He argues that if we take this extensive bias for granted, and assume that, because of it, it is better for us to have goods in the future than in the past, we can explain why it is rational to deplore death more than we do our not having always existed: the former, not the latter, deprives us of good things in the future (he need not say that it is because it is in the past that we worr...

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective