World-indexing properties conflates levels of description. If B-properties include 'being in world W', this presupposes the very B-completeness needed to establish strong supervenience, risking circularity.
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World-indexing properties(metaphysics and possible worlds)
Characteristics or features of something that depend on which possible world or scenario you're talking about—like how 'being cold' might be true in one imaginary world but false in another.
strong supervenience(Conceded by Kim to not be entailed by global supervenience)
A supervenience relation where, across all possible worlds, any individual that shares B-properties with another individual also shares A-properties with that individual