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Inverse View
It is not the case that Zombie conceivability therefore tracks only our epistemic situation regarding mind-brain concepts, not a genuine metaphysical possibility in the world.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Some conceivable scenarios reflect genuine metaphysical possibilities—water being H2O was non-obvious yet necessary, not impossible.
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2.
Dismissing zombie conceivability as mere 'epistemic limitation' begs the question against non-physicalist accounts of consciousness.
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3.
If zombies are conceivable but impossible, this requires explaining why consciousness uniquely resists physicalist reduction unlike other properties.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Conceivability often diverges from possibility—we can imagine perpetual motion machines, but physics forbids them.
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2.
Our concepts of consciousness and neural processes remain partially opaque; conceivability reflects conceptual gaps, not metaphysical gaps.
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3.
If physicalism is true, zombies are impossible, yet remain conceivable—showing conceivability tracks only epistemic accessibility.
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