b. 1967
Neil Levy is a contemporary analytic philosopher specializing in philosophy of mind, moral responsibility, and neuroethics. He is known for arguing that moral responsibility is deeply entangled with luck, consciousness, and the conditions under which agents form beliefs. His work bridges empirical neuroscience and normative philosophy, challenging traditional compatibilist and libertarian accounts of free will.
Developed a luck-based critique of moral responsibility in Hard Luck (2011), arguing that pervasive luck undermines attributions of desert
Advanced the role of consciousness in moral responsibility, arguing in Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (2014) that only conscious mental states ground full accountability
Contributed to neuroethics by exploring how neuroscientific findings bear on agency, self-control, and addiction
Argued that epistemic and metaphysical questions about free will are inseparable from normative ones
Developed an influential account of implicit bias and its implications for moral blameworthiness