The tension between human freedom and divine omniscience
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Some graces are inefficacious
A decision that bypasses the ordeal of undecidability is not a free decision
A free will must be physically and psychologically unforced in its operation.
A high correlation between Houdini's predictions and outcomes can exist even when Houdini abstains in cases of intervention, because the abstentions themselves correlate with the prevention of outcomes.
A human being is not endowed with freedom in the ordinary sense of the term.
A naïve trust in the independence of the will is undermined
A person at a deterministic world can have the ability to act such that some law of nature that does obtain would not obtain, without requiring magical powers.
A person has no power over a consequent fact
A person is free to endeavor to make p happen
A person may be morally responsible for an action despite lacking any ability to do otherwise
A person who feels guilt about a past action is (or was) free in Kant's sense
A person who sincerely accepts mechanistic determinism as the literal truth about themselves cannot coherently believe they are a moral agent.
A physicalist cannot successfully account for free will by identifying it with having a temperature of 37.4º C.
A player can benefit from having their own future options constrained by another player's commitment device.
A player's choice can still be free even when a fortune teller accurately predicts the outcome of that choice.
A player's decision is free even under eternalism, provided the decision is not causally determined.
A player's decision is not as free under eternalism as it would be if the future were ontologically open.
A rational agent's recognition of a reason entails the presence of a relevant desire
A rational agent's voluntary response to a reason cannot consist in behavior motivated by a desire caused by recognizing that reason
A rational will must act under the Idea of its own freedom
A simpler centered incompatibilist account may fare just as well as Kane's indeterminist account against the argument from luck
A successful Ockhamist response to theological fatalism need not await the definitive formulation of necessary and sufficient conditions for soft facthood.
A true prophecy about the contingent future could have been false, even though the past existence of the prophecy is necessary after the fact.
A true proposition belongs to God's free knowledge if and only if it is a contingent truth within God's control
A will that cannot exercise itself except under the Idea of its freedom is free from a practical point of view.
AP1, AP2, and AP3 represent genuine alternative possibilities for Spinoza
Actions brought about by motivations internal to the agent are self-determined
Adam and Eve shared the same psychological faculties, teleology, and moral freedom
Aesthetic and teleological judgment together offer a solution to the problem of how free moral choice can be efficacious within the phenomenal world.
Affirmations of free will in fatalistic scenarios may still be consistent with source compatibilism
knowledge
Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.
free will
An exemption from the laws of nature; the power of doing and forbearing
agent
The party in a principal-agent relationship who is instructed to produce the good or service on the principal's behalf — in the medical context, the doctor
moral responsibility
A normative concept whose scope is contested; the passage implies it encompasses at least Kantian notions (centered on individual rational agency) and other notions (potentially sociological, collective, or non-individualist in character)
determinism
A property of physical theories concerning whether the laws governing a system fully fix future (and past) states given present conditions; admits of degrees ('fall only a bit short')
ability to do otherwise
The capacity of an agent, at the point of action with all circumstances held constant, to have acted differently than they did.
compatibilism
The philosophical position that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism being true
deterministic
Operating under the principle that every event is caused by prior events in an unbreakable chain, leaving no room for genuine freedom or choice.
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