Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Robert Axelrod — Carmelics
    Thinkers/Robert Axelrod
    RA

    Robert Axelrod

    contemporaryAnalytic Political Philosophy, Evolutionary Game Theory

    b. 1943

    Robert Axelrod (born 1943) is an American political scientist and professor at the University of Michigan, best known for his landmark work on the evolution of cooperation using game theory and computer tournaments. His research demonstrated that cooperative strategies can emerge and persist among self-interested agents without central authority, influencing fields from political science and evolutionary biology to economics and philosophy.

    WWikipedia

    Notable Achievements

    1

    Organized iterated Prisoner's Dilemma tournaments showing Tit-for-Tat as a robust cooperative strategy

    2

    Authored 'The Evolution of Cooperation' (1984), a foundational text in evolutionary game theory

    3

    Demonstrated that cooperation can evolve among egoists without central enforcement

    4

    Contributed formal analysis of replicator dynamics and their failure to guarantee convergence to evolutionarily stable states

    5

    Recipient of the MacArthur Fellowship and the National Academy of Sciences membership

    Positions & Arguments(1)

    Modality & Possibility

    claim

    The replicator dynamics need not converge to an evolutionarily stable state.

    Truth & Knowledge

    claim

    The replicator dynamics need not converge to an evolutionarily stable state.

    At a Glance

    Ideas

    1

    Topics

    2

    Era

    contemporary

    Tradition

    Analytic Political Philosophy, Evolutionary Game Theory

    Topic Influence

    Truth & Knowledge1
    Modality & Possibility1

    Related Thinkers

    David Lewis2 sharedImmanuel Kant2 sharedAristotle2 sharedBrian Skyrms2 sharedBertrand Russell2 sharedDavid Hume2 sharedPlato2 sharedStathis Psillos2 shared

    Dive Deeper

    Explore Truth & Knowledge→See Modality & Possibility→