b. 1955
Timothy Williamson is a British philosopher best known for his work in epistemology, philosophical logic, and metaphysics. He is the Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford and has defended knowledge-first epistemology, the view that knowledge is conceptually prior to belief and justification.
Developed knowledge-first epistemology in Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)
Defended epistemicism about vagueness in Vagueness (1994)
Advanced modal logic and necessitism in Modal Logic as Metaphysics (2013)
Argued against the KK principle (knowing that one knows)
Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford
By analogy, simply positing relational tropes does not provide an effective theoretical response to Bradley's argument
claimBoyd's abductive argument for scientific methodology's reliability still stands
claimA priori justification is similar to, but significantly different from, a posteriori justification
claimTestimonial justification can be generated through a chain of testimony even when the transmitting testifier lacks justified belief
Boyd's abductive argument for scientific methodology's reliability still stands
claimCP2 — the claim that we are not justified in denying the skeptical hypothesis — cannot be supported by appealing to the undetectability of skeptical scenarios alone
claimThe preface paradox pressures Kyburg to extend his tolerance of joint inconsistency to the acceptance of contradictions.