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    By analogy, simply positing relational tropes does not pr... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    By analogy, simply positing relational tropes does not provide an effective theoretical response to Bradley's argument

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Simply positing God does not theoretically solve the Problem of Evil
      ?

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    • 2.The case of positing relational tropes to address Bradley's regress is analogous to positing God to address the Problem of Evil
      ?

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    • 3.Positing relational tropes does not explain how a relation relates without requiring a further relation
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Relational tropes, unlike God in the Problem of Evil, can be understood as sui generis connectors that are individuated by their relating function itself.
      ?

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    • 2.Keith Campbell and D.M. Armstrong argue that tropes possess intrinsic adicity, meaning a dyadic trope is constitutively connecting and requires no further truthmaker for its relating.
      ?

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    • 3.If relating is internal to the nature of a relational trope, Bradley's regress never gets started, making the analogy to the Problem of Evil structurally disanalogous.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The analogy between positing God and positing relational tropes fails because the Problem of Evil generates a logical tension within a pre-accepted framework, while Bradley's regress targets the framework itself.
      ?

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    • 2.E.J. Lowe's four-category ontology demonstrates that formal ontological relations, unlike contingent relations, do not require a further relation to bind them to their relata, blocking the regress at the level of ontological structure.
      ?

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    • 3.If at least one category of relation is non-contingently connecting by its formal nature, then positing relational tropes of that category constitutes a genuine theoretical response, not a mere posit.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Notable Defenders

    Andrew NewmancontemporaryNewman 2002
    ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1978b: 75
    Bertrand RussellcontemporaryRussell 1913: 85–7
    Charles CrosscontemporaryCross 2000
    Christopher MenzelcontemporaryMenzel 1993: 62–4
    D. M. ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1978b: 84–5, 1989: 43, 1997: 87–9
    D. M. ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1978b: 86
    David ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1978b: 42, 94
    David ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1978a: 76–77
    David Lewiscontemporary
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis 1986: 68
    David Lewiscontemporary
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis 1986: 62
    David Lewiscontemporary
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis 1986: ix–xvi
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis 1986: 61
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis 1986: 55–59
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis 1983: 352
    David LiebesmancontemporaryLiebesman 2014
    Dennis LehmkuhlcontemporaryLehmkuhl 2011
    Don RosscontemporaryLadyman & Ross 2007: 130–89
    E. J. LowecontemporaryLowe 2016: 111–2
    E. J. LowecontemporaryLowe 2013: 242; 2016: 102–11
    Edward ZaltacontemporaryZalta 1988: 46–7
    Edward ZaltacontemporaryZalta 1988: 51–52
    Erwin TegtmeiercontemporaryTegtmeier 1990, 2004, 2016
    Francesco OriliacontemporaryOrilia 2011: 6–9, 2014: 294, 296–301
    Fraser MacBridecontemporaryMacBride 2011: 162–6
    Fraser MacBridecontemporaryMacBride 2007: 47–53
    Fraser MacBridecontemporaryMacBride 2014: 5–7, 9–10
    Fraser MacBridecontemporaryMacBride 2007: 36–44
    Fraser MacBridecontemporaryMacBride 2014: 14–15
    Fraser MacBridecontemporaryMacbride 2007: 54–55
    George BealercontemporaryBealer 1982: 9–10
    George BealercontemporaryBealer 1982: 2–3
    Gustav BergmanncontemporaryBergmann 1981: 147
    Harold HodescontemporaryHodes 1982
    Hector-Neri CastañedacontemporaryCastañeda 1975: 239–40
    Herbert HochbergcontemporaryHochberg 1981, 2001: 176–7
    Herbert HochbergcontemporaryHochberg 1999: 157–60
    Herbert HochbergcontemporaryHochberg 1987, 1999: 180–81
    Herbert HochbergcontemporaryHochberg 1999: 153, 2000: 40–1
    HochbergcontemporaryHochberg 2001: 178
    James LadymancontemporaryFrench & Ladyman 2003; Ladyman & Ross 2007; Ladyman 2016
    Jan Willem WielandcontemporaryWieland 2010: 487–93
    Jeremy ButterfieldcontemporaryButterfield 2014, 2015
    Jeremy Butterfieldcontemporary
    Jeremy ButterfieldcontemporaryButterfield 2006, 2011
    John BigelowcontemporaryBigelow & Pargetter 1990: 56–60
    John BigelowcontemporaryBigelow & Pargetter 1990: 62–82
    John BigelowcontemporaryBigelow and Pargetter 1990: 77
    John HeilcontemporaryHeil 2012: 141; Heil 2016: 130
    John HeilcontemporaryHeil 2009: 316–7; 2012: 144–6; 2016: 130
    Joop LeocontemporaryLeo 2014: 279–81
    Joop LeocontemporaryLeo 2013
    Keith CampbellcontemporaryCampbell 1990: 108–9
    Keith CampbellcontemporaryCampbell 1990: 99–101
    Kevin MulligancontemporaryMulligan 1998: 347
    Kit FinecontemporaryFine 2000: 2–5
    Kit FinecontemporaryFine 2000: 20–32
    Kit FinecontemporaryFine 2007: 59–62
    Kit FinecontemporaryFine 2000: 17–18, 2007: 58–9
    Kit FinecontemporaryFine 2000: 3
    Markku KeinänencontemporaryKeinänen 2020
    Maureen DonnellycontemporaryDonnelly 2016: 88–96, 94
    Michael EsfeldcontemporaryEsfeld 2004, 2016
    Michael TooleycontemporaryTooley 1988
    Milton FiskcontemporaryFisk 1972: 146–9
    Paul BenacerrafcontemporaryBenacerraf 1965: 54–62
    Paul TellercontemporaryTeller 1986
    Peter GeachcontemporaryGeach 1957: 33
    Peter SimonscontemporarySimons 2010: 204–5; 2014: 314–5
    Peter van Inwagencontemporaryvan Inwagen 1993: 33–4
    Peter van Inwagencontemporaryvan Inwagen 2006: 453
    Peter van Inwagencontemporaryvan Inwagen 2006: 459
    Philip KitchercontemporaryKitcher 1978: 125–6
    Robert PargettercontemporaryBigelow & Pargetter 1990: 56–60
    Robert PargettercontemporaryBigelow & Pargetter 1990: 62–82
    Robert PargettercontemporaryBigelow and Pargetter 1990: 77
    Scott DixoncontemporaryDixon 2018: 31, n.21; 2019: 56–67
    Stathis PsilloscontemporaryPsillos 2001, 2006
    Stephen MumfordcontemporaryBrinceño & Mumford 2016
    Steven FrenchcontemporaryFrench & Ladyman 2003
    Timothy WilliamsoncontemporaryWilliamson 2013: 226–7
    Bertrand RussellmodernRussell 1912: 55–6
    Bertrand RussellmodernRussell 1913: 86–7
    Bertrand RussellmodernRussell 1919: 41–52
    F. H. Bradleymodern
    G. E. MooremodernMoore 1919: 47
    Gottlob FregemodernFrege 1884: §64
    J.M.E. McTaggartmodernMcTaggart 1920: §80
    Kazimierz KuratowskimodernKuratowski definition of ordered pairs
    Norbert WienermodernWiener's set-theoretic construction of sequences

    Connections

    2 topics

    Problem of Evil2 linkedNatural Theology1 linked

    Related

    E.J. Lowe's four-category ontology demonstrates that formal ontological relation...If at least one category of relation is non-contingently connecting by its forma...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: relations
    View source passageHide passage
    Next, take (2). Maurin and Simons argue that if we reject Bradley’s assumption that relations are general entities, i.e. universals, and hold instead that relations are a special class of particular entities, i.e., non-transferable tropes, then we can avoid Bradley’s Regress. What is a relation conceived as a “non-transferable trope”? It’s a relation \(r_1\) that’s borne essentially by the things it relates and which could not have been borne by anything else (Simons 2002/3: 6). Suppose \(r_1\)
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    If relating is internal to the nature of a relational trope, Bradley's regress n...
    Keith Campbell and D.M. Armstrong argue that tropes possess intrinsic adicity, m...
    +5 moreShow less
    Positing relational tropes does not explain how a relation relates without requi...Relational tropes, unlike God in the Problem of Evil, can be understood as sui g...Simply positing God does not theoretically solve the Problem of EvilThe analogy between positing God and positing relational tropes fails because th...The case of positing relational tropes to address Bradley's regress is analogous...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit