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    A being by substance is not a being by participation. — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

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    Supports→God cannot be composite but must be absolutely simple.

    A being by substance is not a being by participation.

    Divine AttributesNatural Theology
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Everything that is caused is other than its being and thus is a being by participation.
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    • 2.A being by substance is its being (not other than its being).
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Participation admits of degrees: a being can participate in its own esse as a mode of self-constitution, not merely as derivation from another.
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    • 2.Aquinas's real distinction between esse and essentia applies even to God's effects in ways that blur the binary of substance-being vs. participation-being.
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    • 3.If participation entails ontological dependence, then a necessary being whose existence is self-grounded could be both being-by-substance and being-by-participation simultaneously.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Plotinus's One transcends being entirely, suggesting that the highest principle is neither being-by-substance nor being-by-participation but prior to both categories.
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    • 2.If the claim relies on the convertibility of being and essence in God, then the distinction between 'being by substance' and 'being by participation' presupposes a categorial framework inapplicable to the divine nature.
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    Topics

    Divine AttributesNatural Theology

    Connections

    1 topic

    Causation1 linked

    Related

    A being by substance is its being (not other than its being).Aquinas's real distinction between esse and essentia applies even to God's effec...Everything that is caused is other than its being and thus is a being by partici...If participation entails ontological dependence, then a necessary being whose ex...
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    If the claim relies on the convertibility of being and essence in God, then the ...Participation admits of degrees: a being can participate in its own esse as a mo...Plotinus's One transcends being entirely, suggesting that the highest principle ...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: william-auvergne
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    The uniqueness of a being by substance is, William argues, a consequence of its absolute simplicity, since nothing could differentiate two or more absolutely simple beings. The absolute simplicity of a being by substance, in turn, is a consequence of the fact that it cannot be caused (not, at least by an external causation; William argues that the being by substance is the Christian Trinity of persons and he admits a kind of internal causation in the Trinity). For everything that is caused is ot
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit