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    A connection between theoretical domains that is too loos... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Even if two theories instantiate a relation of the sort required by Nagel's model, we should not speak of proper reduction if the connection between the domains of the two theories remains too loose to support materialist claims.

    A connection between theoretical domains that is too loose, as a matter of epistemic possibility, fails to support the materialist claims reduction is meant to establish.

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    Even if two theories instantiate a relation of the sort required by Nagel's mode...Nagel's model of reduction requires a specific kind of bridge relation between t...

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    Even if two theories instantiate a relation of the sort required by Na...84%Modal claims connecting aspects of thought to one another face no obvi...76%Nagel's model of reduction requires a specific kind of bridge relation...74%Epistemic theories make epistemological demands that are impossible to...74%

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    Thus, even if two theories instantiate a relation of the sort required by Nagel’s model, we should not speak of proper reduction, if as a matter of epistemic possibility the connection between the domains of the two theories remains too loose to support the materialist claims. Levine (1993) gives this an epistemological interpretation; Chalmers (1996) seems to suggest that the epistemic possibility of two concepts coming apart implies that there is a metaphysical possibility of the two propertie

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