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    Even if two theories instantiate a relation of the sort r... — Carmelics
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    Even if two theories instantiate a relation of the sort required by Nagel's model, we should not speak of proper reduction if the connection between the domains of the two theories remains too loose to support materialist claims.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Nagel's model of reduction requires a specific kind of bridge relation between two theories.
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    • 2.A connection between theoretical domains that is too loose, as a matter of epistemic possibility, fails to support the materialist claims reduction is meant to establish.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Bridge laws in Nagel's model need not assert identity; they may express nomological coextension, which is sufficient for inter-theoretic reduction without full materialist commitment.
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    • 2.Requiring reduction to 'support materialist claims' conflates the epistemic project of theory unification with the metaphysical project of ontological elimination, which Nagel's model never intended to serve.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kemeny and Oppenheim's purely syntactic model of reduction achieves explanatory absorption of one theory by another without any appeal to inter-domain ontological tightness.
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    • 2.If reduction can be formally complete under Kemeny-Oppenheim without satisfying materialist constraints, then materialist adequacy is not a necessary condition on legitimate reduction.
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    Key Terms

    Nagel's model(as the framework being discussed for theory reduction)
    Thomas Nagel is a philosopher who created a framework for thinking about how scientific theories relate to each other. His model describes the conditions under which one theory can explain or connect to another theory.
    domains (of theories)(in describing the gap between what two theories address)
    The specific areas, subjects, or phenomena that a theory covers or explains; what a theory is about.
    instantiate(as used in metaphysics)
    To be a concrete example of something, or to have and display a particular property or category.
    materialism (or materialist claims)(as the philosophical position that a loose connection between theories would fail to support)
    The philosophical view that everything in the universe, including thoughts and consciousness, is ultimately made of physical matter and energy—nothing non-physical exists.
    reduction (or proper reduction)(as the key concept being evaluated)
    In science and philosophy, when one theory is shown to be a special case of a bigger theory, or when complex phenomena are explained by simpler underlying rules. 'Proper reduction' means this connection is legitimate and complete.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Philosophy of Language1 linkedSkepticism1 linked

    Related

    A connection between theoretical domains that is too loose, as a matter of epist...Bridge laws in Nagel's model need not assert identity; they may express nomologi...

    Source

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    Thus, even if two theories instantiate a relation of the sort required by Nagel’s model, we should not speak of proper reduction, if as a matter of epistemic possibility the connection between the domains of the two theories remains too loose to support the materialist claims. Levine (1993) gives this an epistemological interpretation; Chalmers (1996) seems to suggest that the epistemic possibility of two concepts coming apart implies that there is a metaphysical possibility of the two propertie
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    If reduction can be formally complete under Kemeny-Oppenheim without satisfying ...
    Kemeny and Oppenheim's purely syntactic model of reduction achieves explanatory ...
    +2 moreShow less
    Nagel's model of reduction requires a specific kind of bridge relation between t...Requiring reduction to 'support materialist claims' conflates the epistemic proj...

    Similar

    A connection between theoretical domains that is too loose, as a matte...84%Nagel's model of reduction requires a specific kind of bridge relation...83%Higher-level theories are legitimately reduced to lower-level theories...77%Therefore, there are no necessary connections between the mereological...75%
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    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit