- Haecceitist ontologies(metaphysics)
- Philosophical views that say individual things have a special 'thisness' or 'whatness' that makes them uniquely themselves—not just based on their properties, but something deeper. Haecceitists believe two things could be completely identical in every property yet still be different things.
- Ontology(Carnap argues this enterprise is based on a mistake)
- The philosophical discipline that tries to answer hard questions about what there really is.
- begging the question(Listed alongside equivocation as an example of a fallacy that highlights important issues in real-life arguing)
- A fallacy also known as circular reasoning
- counterexample([IHT] arg. 2)
- A possible obligational situation (casus possibilis positus) that verifies the antecedent and falsifies the consequent of an inference
- cross-world identity(as used in metaphysics and modal logic)
- The idea that the same object or person can exist in different possible scenarios or alternate realities. For example, you in this world and you in an alternate world where you became a doctor instead of a teacher.
- global supervenience(Modal supervenience relations in philosophy of mind and metaphysics)
- A globally supervenes on B if and only if no two possible worlds share the same global pattern of distribution of B-properties while differing in their global pattern of distribution of A-properties.
- strong individual supervenience(Metaphysics of supervenience; contrasted with global supervenience)
- A supervenience relation holding at the level of individual entities, such that any two individuals alike in subvening properties are alike in supervening properties
- supervenience(Philosophy of mind and reduction; contrasted with full reduction)
- A relation in which mental (or higher-level) states are dependent on physiological (or lower-level) states such that any two cases with identical lower-level bases are identical in their higher-level states; a necessary but not sufficient condition for reduction.