Reanalyzing counterexamples to strong individual supervenience as global supervenience failures presupposes non-haecceitist modalsemantics, which the haecceitist rightfully rejects.
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global supervenience(Modal supervenience relations in philosophy of mind and metaphysics)
A globally supervenes on B if and only if no two possible worlds share the same global pattern of distribution of B-properties while differing in their global pattern of distribution of A-properties.
strong individual supervenience(Metaphysics of supervenience; contrasted with global supervenience)
A supervenience relation holding at the level of individual entities, such that any two individuals alike in subvening properties are alike in supervening properties
supervenience(Philosophy of mind and reduction; contrasted with full reduction)
A relation in which mental (or higher-level) states are dependent on physiological (or lower-level) states such that any two cases with identical lower-level bases are identical in their higher-level states; a necessary but not sufficient condition for reduction.