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    A cruel response may be exactly what circumstances call for — Carmelics
    Home/Virtue Ethics
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    Supports→Virtues do not function as invariant reasons for action

    A cruel response may be exactly what circumstances call for

    ConsequentialismVirtue Ethics
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    Virtue EthicsConsequentialism

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    An action can be considerate without necessarily being better for that reasonThe torturer's other activities prevent what would ordinarily give a reason from...Virtues do not function as invariant reasons for actionWiping a torturer's brow may be considerate, yet this consideration does not con...

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    Placing oneself in the situation of those one has injured reveals that...74%Virtuous behavior is difficult, requiring harsh and bitter afflictions...73%Moral goodness requires appropriateness of circumstances72%Dogmatism leads to cruelty71%

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    SEP: moral-particularism
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    Of course, for the suggestion to work, it must be the case that the virtues function invariantly. Particularists are likely to say, for instance, that an action can be considerate without necessarily being the better for it. It may be considerate to wipe the torturer’s brow, but this fact hardly functions as a reason to wipe, or makes his sweat a reason for us to wipe it off. The torturer’s other activities prevent what would ordinarily give us a reason from doing so here. Similarly, it may be t

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