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    Virtues do not function as invariant reasons for action — Carmelics
    Home/Virtue Ethics
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    Virtues do not function as invariant reasons for action

    Virtue Ethics
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.An action can be considerate without necessarily being better for that reason
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    • 2.Wiping a torturer's brow may be considerate, yet this consideration does not constitute a reason to perform the action
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    • 3.The torturer's other activities prevent what would ordinarily give a reason from doing so in that context
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Virtues like justice and honesty track objective features of situations that generate pro tanto reasons regardless of contextual outcome.
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    • 2.Aristotle's doctrine of the mean entails that virtuous action is relative to circumstances, but the virtue itself remains a stable disposition providing invariant normative direction.
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    • 3.The torturer example conflates the weight of a reason with its existence—considerateness generates a genuine reason that is simply outweighed, not cancelled.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Rosalind Hursthouse's account of virtue ethics holds that a virtue reliably motivates right action across relevantly similar cases, constituting a structural invariance in practical reasoning.
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    • 2.If virtues generated no invariant reasons, the distinction between virtue and mere habit would collapse, undermining the evaluative core of virtue ethics itself.
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    Topics

    Virtue Ethics

    Connections

    2 topics

    Moral Responsibility2 linkedConsequentialism1 linked

    Related

    A cruel response may be exactly what circumstances call forAn action can be considerate without necessarily being better for that reasonAristotle's doctrine of the mean entails that virtuous action is relative to cir...If virtues generated no invariant reasons, the distinction between virtue and me...
    +5 moreShow less
    Rosalind Hursthouse's account of virtue ethics holds that a virtue reliably moti...The torturer example conflates the weight of a reason with its existence—conside...The torturer's other activities prevent what would ordinarily give a reason from...Virtues like justice and honesty track objective features of situations that gen...Wiping a torturer's brow may be considerate, yet this consideration does not con...

    Similar

    Particularists argue that virtues like considerateness and cruelty do ...79%Moral obligations entail reasons for action73%Human actions are often best explained by the framework employed for j...72%Morals cannot be derived from reason.70%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: moral-particularism
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    Of course, for the suggestion to work, it must be the case that the virtues function invariantly. Particularists are likely to say, for instance, that an action can be considerate without necessarily being the better for it. It may be considerate to wipe the torturer’s brow, but this fact hardly functions as a reason to wipe, or makes his sweat a reason for us to wipe it off. The torturer’s other activities prevent what would ordinarily give us a reason from doing so here. Similarly, it may be t
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit