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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    42
    A decision that bypasses the ordeal of undecidability is ... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    A decision that bypasses the ordeal of undecidability is not a free decision

    Free Will & Foreknowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.A free decision requires experiencing that the singular case does not fit established codes and that a decision therefore seems impossible
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    • 2.A decision that does not pass through this ordeal is merely the programmable application of a calculable process
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    • 3.The programmable application of a calculable process is not freedom
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Frankfurt's hierarchical compatibilism shows freedom consists in acting from endorsed second-order volitions, not in confronting undecidability.
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    • 2.An agent who reflectively identifies with a decision-procedure and acts from it exercises genuine autonomy without requiring experiential paralysis.
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    • 3.Requiring 'ordeal' as a condition of freedom conflates phenomenological difficulty with the metaphysical conditions for free agency.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Aristotle's account in Nicomachean Ethics grounds virtuous decision in stable hexis, where the excellent agent reliably chooses well without deliberative anguish.
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    • 2.If undecidability were necessary for freedom, the morally virtuous agent—who acts rightly with least hesitation—would paradoxically be least free.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityFree Will & Foreknowledge

    Related

    A decision that does not pass through this ordeal is merely the programmable app...A free decision requires experiencing that the singular case does not fit establ...An agent who reflectively identifies with a decision-procedure and acts from it ...Aristotle's account in Nicomachean Ethics grounds virtuous decision in stable he...
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    Frankfurt's hierarchical compatibilism shows freedom consists in acting from end...If undecidability were necessary for freedom, the morally virtuous agent—who act...Requiring 'ordeal' as a condition of freedom conflates phenomenological difficul...The programmable application of a calculable process is not freedom

    Similar

    A free decision requires experiencing that the singular case does not ...81%The player's decision may be regarded as free in the sense that nothin...81%A choice that is fully determined by prior causes cannot be genuinely ...77%God's free knowledge is subject to God's free decision77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: derrida
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    Derrida calls the first aporia, “the epoche of the rule” (Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, pp. 22–23). Our most common axiom in ethical or political thought is that to be just or unjust and to exercise justice, one must be free and responsible for one’s actions and decisions. Here Derrida in effect is asking: what is freedom. On the one hand, freedom consists in following a rule; but in the case of justice, we would say that a judgment that simply followed the law was only right, n
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit