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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that A generic/determinable universal cannot be identified with any specific/determinate universal

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Determinable predicates like 'colored' are grounded in and fully reducible to determinate properties like 'red' via a priori entailment chains (Jackson 1998).
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    • 2.If determinables are just ways of picking out determinates under incomplete description, 'colored' and 'red' co-refer in contexts where redness is the only instantiated color.
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    • 3.When co-reference holds under all possible completions, the indiscernibility argument fails to establish non-identity—it instead shows only incomplete specification.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Armstrong's sparse universals ontology holds that only fully determinate properties are genuine universals; determinables are merely nominalistically useful predicates with no distinct ontological status.
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    • 2.If determinables lack independent ontological standing, the causal-relations asymmetry cited in P3 reflects epistemic incompleteness, not a real difference in entities.
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    • 3.A difference in causal descriptions under incomplete information cannot satisfy the Leibnizian criterion for non-identity, since that criterion requires differing in a genuine property, not a descriptivist shadow.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If a generic type G has only a proper subset of the causal relations of a specific type S, then G and S differ in at least one property
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    • 2.By the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, entities that differ in any property cannot be identical
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    • 3.On the subset-of-causal-relations account, G has only a proper subset of the causal relations of S
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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.