A genuinely non-doxastic state that lacks correctness conditions cannot transmit propositional justification to beliefs about how things appear, as Pryor's dogmatist account implicitly concedes by requiring 'seemings' to have propositional structure.
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correctness conditions(Platitude about meaningful expressions)
Conditions under which an application of an expression counts as correct, such that mistaken or erroneous applications are in principle possible.
propositional justification(Acquaintance theory of epistemic justification)
Justification that a subject has or possesses for believing that p, even if the subject does not believe that p or does not properly base a belief on that justification; requires acquaintance with a relevant fact plus awareness of that fact's relevance to p's truth.
propositional structure(Introduced as a convenient label for the kind of structure truth-makers must possess.)
Structure, syntactic or quasi-syntactic, of the same general kind possessed by declarative sentences, thoughts, and propositions.
seemings(Epistemology of perception and foundationalism)
Non-belief perceptual or experiential states that play the epistemological role of conferring justification on basic beliefs without themselves requiring justification