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    The Sellarsian dilemma undermines the epistemological rol... — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
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    The Sellarsian dilemma undermines the epistemological role foundationalism requires of experiences

    Perception
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.BonJour's internalist critique establishes that a mental state can confer justification only if the subject has cognitive access to its justificatory status, which transforms the state into a belief-like entity subject to further normative assessment.
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    • 2.If experiences must be representationally contentful to justify beliefs, as Crane and Peacocke argue, then they possess correctness conditions and are assessable as accurate or inaccurate, making them functionally doxastic rather than foundational.
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    • 3.A genuinely non-doxastic state that lacks correctness conditions cannot transmit propositional justification to beliefs about how things appear, as Pryor's dogmatist account implicitly concedes by requiring 'seemings' to have propositional structure.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wilfrid Sellars's 'Myth of the Given' demonstrates that any epistemic authority attributed to raw sensory states presupposes conceptual capacities that cannot themselves be non-inferentially justified.
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    • 2.McDowell's attempt to dissolve the dilemma via 'second nature' merely relocates the regress, since the acquisition of conceptual capacities in Bildung itself requires prior epistemic grounding that foundationalism cannot supply non-doxastically.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Foundationalism requires that experiences justify beliefs without themselves needing justification
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    • 2.Non-conceptual awareness of sensations cannot account for the justification of appearance beliefs
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    • 3.Conceptual awareness of sensations is itself a justified doxastic state and thus cannot serve as a non-doxastic justificatory foundation
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    Perception

    Related

    A genuinely non-doxastic state that lacks correctness conditions cannot transmit...BonJour's internalist critique establishes that a mental state can confer justif...Conceptual awareness of sensations is itself a justified doxastic state and thus...Foundationalism requires that experiences justify beliefs without themselves nee...
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    If experiences must be representationally contentful to justify beliefs, as Cran...McDowell's attempt to dissolve the dilemma via 'second nature' merely relocates ...Non-conceptual awareness of sensations does not account for the justification of...Wilfrid Sellars's 'Myth of the Given' demonstrates that any epistemic authority ...

    Similar

    Attention plays a role in experience that McDowell's theory fails to a...74%Perceptual experiences are epistemically asymmetrical between subjects...73%Seemings play the epistemological role of conferring justification on ...73%Strawson's argument in The Bounds of Sense only establishes how experi...72%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: perception-episprob
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    Perhaps the most important problem for this view concerns the relevant understanding of seemings, or perceptual experience. It is clear that seemings must be non-belief states of some sort, as their epistemological role is to confer justification on basic beliefs, and the latter wouldn’t be basic if seemings were themselves beliefs. The “Sellarsian dilemma” is a famous argument, due perhaps as much to BonJour (1978, 1985) as to Sellars (1956), which claims that “experience” and “seemings” and th
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit