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    A numerically singular thing does not possess less-than-n... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
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    Supports→A numerically singular thing is indivisible into subjective parts.

    A numerically singular thing does not possess less-than-numerical unity.

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
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    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

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    A numerically singular thing is indivisible into subjective parts.Numerical singularity entails indivisibility into subjective parts.What allows a common nature to be divided into subjective parts is its possessio...

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    Each numerically distinct thing possesses numerical singularity.89%Merely numerical distinction — as opposed to specific distinction — en...84%Denominative numerical singularity is compatible with the same common ...83%Similarity between different instances of the same kind requires that ...82%

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    SEP: medieval-haecceity
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    Divisibility into subjective parts, of course, is on the face of it very different from the question of division from all other things, so nicely exemplified in Black’s example of the qualitatively identical spheres. Scotus’s assumption, however, is that both questions can be answered in the same way. Thus Scotus supposes that the explanation for distinction is the explanation for indivisibility, and the rough outline of what he is thinking looks as follows. The explanation for distinction is pr

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