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    A numerically singular thing is indivisible into subjecti... — Carmelics
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    A numerically singular thing is indivisible into subjective parts.

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Numerical singularity entails indivisibility into subjective parts.
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    • 2.What allows a common nature to be divided into subjective parts is its possession of less-than-numerical unity.
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    • 3.A numerically singular thing does not possess less-than-numerical unity.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.A numerically singular thing can possess internal heterogeneous parts that function as subjective divisions without undermining its numerical unity.
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    • 2.Aristotle's hylomorphic composites are numerically one yet divisible into matter and form, which serve as distinct subjective principles within a single substance.
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    • 3.Therefore numerical singularity and division into subjective parts are not mutually exclusive, contra Scotus's assumption.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Less-than-numerical unity is not the only ground for subjective parthood; real distinctions within a numerically singular thing can ground such division.
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    • 2.Suárez's formal distinction critique holds that Scotus illegitimately reifies modal distinctions into quasi-subjective parts within individuals, conflating logical and real division.
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    • 3.If real distinctions within a singular thing suffice for subjective parts, then numerical singularity does not entail indivisibility into such parts.
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    Related

    A numerically singular thing can possess internal heterogeneous parts that funct...A numerically singular thing does not possess less-than-numerical unity.Aristotle's hylomorphic composites are numerically one yet divisible into matter...If real distinctions within a singular thing suffice for subjective parts, then ...
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    Less-than-numerical unity is not the only ground for subjective parthood; real d...Numerical singularity entails indivisibility into subjective parts.Suárez's formal distinction critique holds that Scotus illegitimately reifies mo...Therefore numerical singularity and division into subjective parts are not mutua...What allows a common nature to be divided into subjective parts is its possessio...

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    Numerical singularity entails indivisibility into subjective parts.91%Each numerically distinct thing possesses numerical singularity.83%What allows a common nature to be divided into subjective parts is its...82%A numerically singular thing does not possess less-than-numerical unit...81%

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    SEP: medieval-haecceity
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    Divisibility into subjective parts, of course, is on the face of it very different from the question of division from all other things, so nicely exemplified in Black’s example of the qualitatively identical spheres. Scotus’s assumption, however, is that both questions can be answered in the same way. Thus Scotus supposes that the explanation for distinction is the explanation for indivisibility, and the rough outline of what he is thinking looks as follows. The explanation for distinction is pr
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    3 (1 for, 2 against)
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