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    A person who experienced different events would not be th... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    A person who experienced different events would not be the same individual (Adam) but a numerically distinct person (another Adam).

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Nothing prevents us from saying that a being who experienced different events would be another individual.
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    • 2.If different events had happened to Adam, the resulting being would not have been our Adam.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's causal-historical theory holds that names are rigid designators picking out the same individual across all possible worlds.
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    • 2.If 'Adam' rigidly designates this individual, then a counterfactual Adam who suffered different events is still numerically identical Adam, not a distinct person.
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    • 3.Leibniz's inference conflates qualitative distinctness with numerical distinctness, which rigid designation precisely separates.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Locke's psychological continuity theory individuates persons by chains of memory and consciousness, not by the totality of experienced events.
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    • 2.A being who experienced different events could share sufficient psychological continuity with Adam to constitute the very same person on this criterion.
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    • 3.Leibniz's complete individual concept criterion for identity is thus one contested framework among alternatives, not an inescapable metaphysical truth.
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    Topics

    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

    Related

    A being who experienced different events could share sufficient psychological co...If 'Adam' rigidly designates this individual, then a counterfactual Adam who suf...If different events had happened to Adam, the resulting being would not have bee...Kripke's causal-historical theory holds that names are rigid designators picking...
    +4 moreShow less
    Leibniz's complete individual concept criterion for identity is thus one contest...Leibniz's inference conflates qualitative distinctness with numerical distinctne...Locke's psychological continuity theory individuates persons by chains of memory...Nothing prevents us from saying that a being who experienced different events wo...

    Similar

    Nothing prevents us from saying that a being who experienced different...89%It is not possible for there to be two individuals that are entirely a...82%The psychological-continuity view entails the original person is both ...80%Universals and individuals are really the same but formally distinct.79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: leibniz-modal
    View source passageHide passage
    It, therefore, also follows that he would not have been our Adam, but another Adam, had other events happened to him, for nothing prevents us from saying that he would be another. Therefore, he is another. (G II 41–42/AG 72–73)
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit