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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that A phenomenal zombie and a conscious being share identical causal powers by definition, yet Chalmers argues they instantiate distinct psychological states.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Zombies are conceivable but not metaphysically possible given our physics; conceivability alone doesn't establish distinct psychological states.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If zombies truly share all causal powers, they must process information identically—making consciousness epiphenomenal or not a genuine psychological state.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Defining zombies by causal identity while claiming psychological difference conflates consciousness with subjective appearance rather than properties.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Causal powers exhaust what functional/behavioral theories can capture, yet consciousness involves intrinsic phenomenal properties beyond function.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The zombie intuition shows conceivability of identical causes with different conscious states, suggesting consciousness is metaphysically distinct.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If psychological states were solely constituted by causal powers, consciousness couldn't vary while causation remains constant—but it can.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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