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    A phenomenal zombie and a conscious being share identical... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→If two psychological states are incapable of causing anything different to happen, then the two psychological states must be the same.

    A phenomenal zombie and a conscious being share identical causal powers by definition, yet Chalmers argues they instantiate distinct psychological states.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Causal powers exhaust what functional/behavioral theories can capture, yet consciousness involves intrinsic phenomenal properties beyond function.
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    • 2.The zombie intuition shows conceivability of identical causes with different conscious states, suggesting consciousness is metaphysically distinct.
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    • 3.If psychological states were solely constituted by causal powers, consciousness couldn't vary while causation remains constant—but it can.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Zombies are conceivable but not metaphysically possible given our physics; conceivability alone doesn't establish distinct psychological states.
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    • 2.If zombies truly share all causal powers, they must process information identically—making consciousness epiphenomenal or not a genuine psychological state.
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    • 3.Defining zombies by causal identity while claiming psychological difference conflates consciousness with subjective appearance rather than properties.
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    Causation1 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Causal powers exhaust what functional/behavioral theories can capture, yet consc...Defining zombies by causal identity while claiming psychological difference conf...If psychological states were solely constituted by causal powers, consciousness ...If two psychological states are incapable of causing anything different to happe...
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    If zombies truly share all causal powers, they must process information identica...The zombie intuition shows conceivability of identical causes with different con...Zombies are conceivable but not metaphysically possible given our physics; conce...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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