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    A principle of demonstration must be necessary, not merel... — Carmelics
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    A principle of demonstration must be necessary, not merely true.

    Truth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.A necessary conclusion follows from necessary premises.
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    • 2.Demonstration requires necessary conclusions.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.John Stuart Mill argued that inductive generalizations from observed regularities constitute genuine scientific knowledge without appealing to metaphysical necessity.
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    • 2.If necessary truth is unavailable to empirical science yet empirical science yields genuine demonstrative knowledge, necessity cannot be a universal condition on demonstrative principles.
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    • 3.Requiring necessity conflates logical or metaphysical modality with the epistemic conditions sufficient for scientific justification.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Aristotle himself acknowledges in Posterior Analytics II.8 that demonstration can proceed from contingent facts about natural kinds that hold 'for the most part'.
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    • 2.If scientific demonstration can accommodate 'for the most part' truths about natural regularities, necessity is too strong a requirement for all demonstrative premises.
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    Related

    A necessary conclusion follows from necessary premises.Aristotle himself acknowledges in Posterior Analytics II.8 that demonstration ca...Demonstration requires necessary conclusions.If necessary truth is unavailable to empirical science yet empirical science yie...
    +3 moreShow less
    If scientific demonstration can accommodate 'for the most part' truths about nat...John Stuart Mill argued that inductive generalizations from observed regularitie...Requiring necessity conflates logical or metaphysical modality with the epistemi...

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: robert-kilwardby
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    It is not, however, enough for a principle of demonstration to be true; it must also be necessary. A necessary conclusion follows from necessary premises (NLP I. 19, 110–113). The kind of universality required for demonstration is not the same as that of a universal acquired through abstraction, which is said of many (ut dicatur de multis)—the kind described in the Perihermeneias and in Porphyry’s Isasoge—but the universal that must be said of all and always (de quodlibet et semper et primo).[2
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit