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    The necessity required for demonstration applies to all t... — Carmelics
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    The necessity required for demonstration applies to all things under the subject on account of what they are.

    Truth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Demonstrative necessity is characterized as de omni, per se, and universale.
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    • 2.This kind of necessity is universal and grounded in the essence of the things under the subject.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Aristotle's own Posterior Analytics distinguishes per se necessity from mere universal predication, allowing accidental universals that don't ground demonstration.
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    • 2.If necessity were solely grounded in what subjects are, mathematical truths about physical objects would require no empirical supplementation, which Aristotle denies in Physics II.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Aquinas and Scotus both argue that essential predication admits degrees of necessity, so 'on account of what they are' underdetermines which essentialist claims license demonstration.
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    • 2.A subject's essence can ground conflicting demonstrative necessities when the same subject falls under multiple scientific domains, as in the case of harmonics and arithmetic.
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    Modality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    A subject's essence can ground conflicting demonstrative necessities when the sa...Aquinas and Scotus both argue that essential predication admits degrees of neces...Aristotle's own Posterior Analytics distinguishes per se necessity from mere uni...Demonstrative necessity is characterized as de omni, per se, and universale.
    +2 moreShow less
    If necessity were solely grounded in what subjects are, mathematical truths abou...This kind of necessity is universal and grounded in the essence of the things un...

    Similar

    A principle of demonstration must be necessary, not merely true.87%If primary premises do not require demonstration, one must have perfec...79%Aristotelian demonstration requires a definition that delimits the pos...79%The existence of the subject of a science must be demonstrated beforeh...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: robert-kilwardby
    View source passageHide passage
    It is not, however, enough for a principle of demonstration to be true; it must also be necessary. A necessary conclusion follows from necessary premises (NLP I. 19, 110–113). The kind of universality required for demonstration is not the same as that of a universal acquired through abstraction, which is said of many (ut dicatur de multis)—the kind described in the Perihermeneias and in Porphyry’s Isasoge—but the universal that must be said of all and always (de quodlibet et semper et primo).[2
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit