Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that A purely contextualist treatment of epistemic modals is insufficient to explain the puzzle of cross-context truth-value shifts.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Contextualism à la DeRose (1992) individuates propositions by the epistemic state of the attributor's context, not merely the sentence uttered.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If 'might p' expresses a proposition about what is compatible with a contextually-fixed body of knowledge, truth-value shifts across contexts reflect distinct propositions, not instability in a single proposition.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The supporting argument's P3 illicitly assumes propositions are context-invariant entities, begging the question against a thoroughgoing contextualist semantics.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.MacFarlane's relativist framework is motivated by eavesdropper cases, but Egan (2007) shows that contextualism can handle these by invoking the eavesdropper's own context as the relevant parameter.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If eavesdropper intuitions—the primary evidence for cross-context truth-value shifts—are explicable within a sophisticated contextualism, the puzzle loses its force as an argument against contextualism.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Contextualism dissolves the puzzle by saying that sentences express different propositions relative to different contexts of utterance.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The puzzle involves not just sentences but propositions varying in truth-value across contexts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If the proposition itself—not merely the sentence—changes truth-value, contextualism about utterance contexts cannot account for the phenomenon.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.