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    A sequential equilibrium requires both a strategy profile... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    A sequential equilibrium requires both a strategy profile and a system of beliefs that are mutually consistent and sequentially rational

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.A sequential equilibrium has two parts: a strategy profile for each player and a system of beliefs for each player
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    • 2.The system of beliefs assigns to each information set a probability distribution over nodes in that set, representing the player's beliefs about where in the information set play has reached
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    • 3.The beliefs must be consistent with Bayes's rule
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Bayes's rule is undefined at off-equilibrium-path information sets reached with probability zero, making belief consistency indeterminate precisely where it matters most.
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    • 2.Kreps and Wilson's own refinement leaves substantial freedom in specifying off-path beliefs, meaning sequential equilibrium underdetermines rational play in the cases it was designed to resolve.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Binmore and Reny demonstrated that sequential rationality presupposes a counterfactual theory of what players would do at unreached nodes, yet no agreed interpretation of counterfactuals in extensive-form games exists.
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    • 2.Without a settled semantics for counterfactual reasoning under irrationality, mutual consistency between strategies and beliefs is a formal artifact rather than a substantive rationality requirement.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    3 topics

    Philosophy of Language2 linkedConsequentialism1 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    A sequential equilibrium has two parts: a strategy profile for each player and a...Bayes's rule is undefined at off-equilibrium-path information sets reached with ...Binmore and Reny demonstrated that sequential rationality presupposes a counterf...Each player must play optimally from every information set onward, given prior b...
    +4 moreShow less
    Kreps and Wilson's own refinement leaves substantial freedom in specifying off-p...The beliefs must be consistent with Bayes's rule

    Similar

    A sequential equilibrium has two parts: a strategy profile for each pl...93%Applying Bayes's rule to sequential equilibrium requires that players ...78%Predicting play consistent with QRE is motivated by the view that Nash...78%A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if and only if no player cou...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
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    If we assume that players’ beliefs are always consistent with this equality, then we may define a sequential equilibrium. A SE has two parts: (1) a strategy profile § for each player, as before, and (2) a system of beliefs μ for each player. μ assigns to each information set h a probability distribution over the nodes in h, with the interpretation that these are the beliefs of player i(h) about where in his information set he is, given that information set h has been reached. Then a sequential e
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    The system of beliefs assigns to each information set a probability distribution...
    Without a settled semantics for counterfactual reasoning under irrationality, mu...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit