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    Kreps and Wilson's own refinement leaves substantial free... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→A sequential equilibrium requires both a strategy profile and a system of beliefs that are mutually consistent and sequentially rational

    Kreps and Wilson's own refinement leaves substantial freedom in specifying off-path beliefs, meaning sequential equilibrium underdetermines rational play in the cases it was designed to resolve.

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    Key Terms

    Kreps and Wilson(in game theory and economics)
    Two game theorists (David Kreps and Robert Wilson) who developed important tools for analyzing strategic situations where players make decisions one after another and don't have complete information about what others are thinking.
    Off-path beliefs(in game theory and decision-making)
    Beliefs about what might happen in situations that don't actually occur during a game or decision scenario—basically, educated guesses about branches of the future that never materialize.
    Rational play(what the theory is supposed to predict)
    Decision-making where players act logically to achieve their own best outcomes, assuming other players do the same.
    sequential equilibrium(Game theory, extensive-form games)
    A solution concept consisting of a strategy profile and a system of beliefs consistent with Bayes's rule, such that every player plays optimally from every information set given those beliefs and the strategy profile

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    underdetermines(logic and language)
    Doesn't fully decide or pin down; leaves open multiple possible interpretations because there isn't enough information visible to choose just one.

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

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    A sequential equilibrium requires both a strategy profile and a system of belief...

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