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    A speaker's intention must be regarded as having some evi... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The intentional fallacy is no fallacy at all in everyday discourse, strictly speaking

    A speaker's intention must be regarded as having some evidential weight in determining the speaker's sentence's meaning

    Philosophy of Language
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    Philosophy of Language

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    A speaker's intention that 'S' means m is criterial for 'S' meaning mThe intentional fallacy is no fallacy at all in everyday discourse, strictly spe...

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    Speaker meaning is explained in terms of speaker intentions.

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    Perhaps paradoxically, given what was just said, the counterexample also illustrates a more important claim, that a speaker’s intention that ‘S’ mean m is a criterion for its meaning m, or at least very nearly so. This is because: (1) linguistic convention is a criterion for token sentence meaning, and a linguistic convention, as the example shows, is a function of overall community understanding, treatment, and belief. (2) A speaker’s intention is one component in such understanding, treatment,

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