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    The intentional fallacy is no fallacy at all in everyday ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    The intentional fallacy is no fallacy at all in everyday discourse, strictly speaking

    Philosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.A speaker's intention that 'S' means m is criterial for 'S' meaning m
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    • 2.A speaker's intention must be regarded as having some evidential weight in determining the speaker's sentence's meaning
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Grice's own framework distinguishes natural meaning from non-natural meaning, where the latter requires uptake of intention by the hearer.
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    • 2.If successful communication requires the hearer to recognize the speaker's intention, then intention is not criterial for meaning but instrumental to it.
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    • 3.A criterion that depends on external uptake for its semantic efficacy is not a criterion in any robust sense, undermining P1's foundational claim.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations show that meaning is constituted by public linguistic practice, not by private intentional states.
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    • 2.If meaning supervenes on social practice rather than individual intention, then a speaker's intention carries evidential weight only derivatively, collapsing P2's premise into a weaker, defeasible heuristic rather than a genuine semantic principle.
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    Philosophy of Language

    Related

    A criterion that depends on external uptake for its semantic efficacy is not a c...A speaker's intention must be regarded as having some evidential weight in deter...A speaker's intention that 'S' means m is criterial for 'S' meaning mGrice's own framework distinguishes natural meaning from non-natural meaning, wh...
    +3 moreShow less
    If meaning supervenes on social practice rather than individual intention, then ...If successful communication requires the hearer to recognize the speaker's inten...Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations show that meaning is constituted by...

    Similar

    Beardsley's argument against the intentional fallacy fails if direct e...81%Hamblin presented the definition of fallacy as 'an argument that seems...78%A fallacy may pass unnoticed and not appear to be a fallacy78%Traditional fallacies which have non-fallacious instances can be under...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: beardsley-aesthetics
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    Perhaps paradoxically, given what was just said, the counterexample also illustrates a more important claim, that a speaker’s intention that ‘S’ mean m is a criterion for its meaning m, or at least very nearly so. This is because: (1) linguistic convention is a criterion for token sentence meaning, and a linguistic convention, as the example shows, is a function of overall community understanding, treatment, and belief. (2) A speaker’s intention is one component in such understanding, treatment,
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit